Radical Islam

Fin de Régime in Syria?

The revolt in Syria offers great opportunities, humanitarian and geo-political. Western states should quickly and robustly seize the moment to dispatch strongman Bashar al-Assad and his accomplice. Many benefits will follow when they reach their appointed dustbin of history.
Syrians pulling down pictures of al-Assads, Bashar (left) and his father Hafez.
Foreign: The malign but tactically brilliant Hafez al-Assad blighted the Middle East with disproportionate Syrian influence for decades. His son, the feckless Bashar, has continued this pattern since 2000 by sending terrorists to Iraq, murdering Lebanon's prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, overthrowing his son Saad, aiding the Hezbollah and Hamas terror groups, and developing chemical and nuclear weapons. His riddance will be a universal boon.
But Bashar's main role internationally is serving as Tehran's premier ally. Despite Westerners usually seeing the Syrian-Iranian alliance as a flimsy marriage of convenience, it has lasted over thirty years, enduring shifts in personnel and circumstances, due to what Jubin Goodarzi in 2006 called the two parties' "broader, long-term strategic concerns derived from their national security priorities."
The Syrian intifada has already weakened the Iranian-led "resistance bloc" by exacerbating political distancing Tehran from Assad and fomenting divisions in the Iranian leadership. Syrian protesters are burning the Iranian flag; were (Sunni) Islamists to take power in Damascus they would terminate the Iranian connection, seriously impairing the mullah's grandiose ambitions.
Kurds protesting for citizenship in Qamishli, Syria, in April 2011.
The end of Assad's rule points to other important consequences. Bashar and the ruling Islamist AK party in Turkey have developed such close relations that some analysts see the Assad regime's removal leading to a collapse of Ankara's entire Middle East policy. Also, unrest among the Kurds of Syria could lead to their greater autonomy that would in turn encourage co-ethnics in Anatolia to demand an independent state, a prospect that so worries Ankara, it sent a stream of high level visitors to Damascus and urgently pushed a counter-insurgency accord on it.
Turmoil in Syria offers relief for Lebanon, which has been under the Syrian thumb since 1976. Similarly, a distracted Damascus permits Israeli strategists, at least temporarily, to focus attention on the country's many other foreign problems.
Domestic: In a smug interview discussing developments in Tunisia and Egypt, and just weeks before his own country erupted on March 15, Bashar al-Assad explained the misery also facing his own subjects: "Whenever you have an uprising, it is self-evident that to say that you have anger [which] feeds on desperation."
The word desperation nicely summarizes the Syrian people's lot; since 1970, the Assad dynasty has dominated Syria with a Stalinist fist only slightly less oppressive than that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Poverty, expropriation, corruption, stasis, oppression, fear, isolation, Islamism, torture, and massacre are the hallmarks of Assad rule.
Vogue's puff-piece on the wife of Bashar al-Assad in its March 2011 issue.
Thanks to Western greed and gullibility, however, outsiders rarely realize the full extent of this reality. On one hand, the Syrian regime financially supports the Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St Andrews. On the other, an informal Syria lobby exists. Thus, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refers to Bashar al-Assad as a "reformer" and Vogue magazine publishes a puff-piece on the tyrant's wife, "Asma al-Assad: A Rose in the Desert" (calling her "glamorous, young, and very chic—the freshest and most magnetic of first ladies").
One potential danger resulting from regime change must be noted. Expect not a relatively gentle coup d'état as in Tunisia or Egypt but a thorough-going revolution directed not only against the Assad clan but also the Alawi community from which it comes. Alawis, a secretive post-Islamic sect making up about one-eighth of the Syrian population, have dominated the government since 1966, arousing deep hostility among the majority Sunnis. Sunnis carry out the intifada and Alawis do the dirty work of repressing and killing them. This tension could fuel a bloodbath and even civil war, possibilities that outside powers must recognize and prepare for.
As impasse persists in Syria, with protesters filling the streets and the regime killing them, Western policy can make a decisive difference. Steven Coll of the New Yorker is right that "The time for hopeful bargaining with Assad has passed." Time has come to brush aside fears of instability for, as analyst Lee Smith rightly observes, "It can't get any worse than the Assads' regime." Time has come to push Bashar from power, to protect innocent Alawis, and to deal with "the devil we don't know."
Mr. Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of three books on Syria.
May 24, 2011 update: For additional thoughts that could not fit into this column, see my weblog entry, "More on Regime Change in Syria."

The revolt in Syria offers great opportunities, humanitarian and geo-political. Western states should quickly and robustly seize the moment to dispatch strongman Bashar al-Assad and his accomplice. Many benefits will follow when they reach their appointed dustbin of history.

Foreign: The malign but tactically brilliant Hafez al-Assad blighted the Middle East with disproportionate Syrian influence for decades. His son, the feckless Bashar, has continued this pattern since 2000 by sending terrorists to Iraq, murdering Lebanon's prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, overthrowing his son Saad, aiding the Hezbollah and Hamas terror groups, and developing chemical and nuclear weapons. His riddance will be a universal boon.

But Bashar's main role internationally is serving as Tehran's premier ally. Despite Westerners usually seeing the Syrian-Iranian alliance as a flimsy marriage of convenience, it has lasted over thirty years, enduring shifts in personnel and circumstances, due to what Jubin Goodarzi in 2006 called the two parties' "broader, long-term strategic concerns derived from their national security priorities."

The Syrian intifada has already weakened the Iranian-led "resistance bloc" by exacerbating political distancing Tehran from Assad and fomenting divisions in the Iranian leadership. Syrian protesters are burning the Iranian flag; were (Sunni) Islamists to take power in Damascus they would terminate the Iranian connection, seriously impairing the mullah's grandiose ambitions.

The end of Assad's rule points to other important consequences. Bashar and the ruling Islamist AK party in Turkey have developed such close relations that some analysts see the Assad regime's removal leading to a collapse of Ankara's entire Middle East policy. Also, unrest among the Kurds of Syria could lead to their greater autonomy that would in turn encourage co-ethnics in Anatolia to demand an independent state, a prospect that so worries Ankara, it sent a stream of high level visitors to Damascus and urgently pushed a counter-insurgency accord on it.

Turmoil in Syria offers relief for Lebanon, which has been under the Syrian thumb since 1976. Similarly, a distracted Damascus permits Israeli strategists, at least temporarily, to focus attention on the country's many other foreign problems.

Domestic: In a smug interview discussing developments in Tunisia and Egypt, and just weeks before his own country erupted on March 15, Bashar al-Assad explained the misery also facing his own subjects: "Whenever you have an uprising, it is self-evident that to say that you have anger [which] feeds on desperation."

The word desperation nicely summarizes the Syrian people's lot; since 1970, the Assad dynasty has dominated Syria with a Stalinist fist only slightly less oppressive than that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Poverty, expropriation, corruption, stasis, oppression, fear, isolation, Islamism, torture, and massacre are the hallmarks of Assad rule.

Thanks to Western greed and gullibility, however, outsiders rarely realize the full extent of this reality. On one hand, the Syrian regime financially supports the Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St Andrews. On the other, an informal Syria lobby exists. Thus, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refers to Bashar al-Assad as a "reformer" and Vogue magazine publishes a puff-piece on the tyrant's wife, "Asma al-Assad: A Rose in the Desert" (calling her "glamorous, young, and very chic—the freshest and most magnetic of first ladies").

One potential danger resulting from regime change must be noted. Expect not a relatively gentle coup d'état as in Tunisia or Egypt but a thorough-going revolution directed not only against the Assad clan but also the Alawi community from which it comes. Alawis, a secretive post-Islamic sect making up about one-eighth of the Syrian population, have dominated the government since 1966, arousing deep hostility among the majority Sunnis. Sunnis carry out the intifada and Alawis do the dirty work of repressing and killing them. This tension could fuel a bloodbath and even civil war, possibilities that outside powers must recognize and prepare for.

As impasse persists in Syria, with protesters filling the streets and the regime killing them, Western policy can make a decisive difference. Steven Coll of the New Yorker is right that "The time for hopeful bargaining with Assad has passed." Time has come to brush aside fears of instability for, as analyst Lee Smith rightly observes, "It can't get any worse than the Assads' regime." Time has come to push Bashar from power, to protect innocent Alawis, and to deal with "the devil we don't know."

Mr. Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of three books on Syria.

3 Things About Islam

3 Things About Islam

Three surprising things you probably didn't know about Islam.
This subject WILL affect you in the near future, so take the chance to inform yourself now - before it does.

Turning the Revolution Islamist

 

IPT News
April 1, 2011
The "Arab Spring" has been synonymous with secular and peaceful demonstrators taking to the streets of the Middle East and, in some cases, taking up arms to fight for lost freedoms.
However, the latest issue of al-Qaida's Inspire Magazine, as well as the rise of renewed Salafist movements in the revolutionary states, suggest that religious ultraconservatives have no intention of ceding the future. The revolutions may have been secular, but the character of new governments is still up for grabs.

IPT News
April 1, 2011

The "Arab Spring" has been synonymous with secular and peaceful demonstrators taking to the streets of the Middle East and, in some cases, taking up arms to fight for lost freedoms.

However, the latest issue of al-Qaida's Inspire Magazine, as well as the rise of renewed Salafist movements in the revolutionary states, suggest that religious ultraconservatives have no intention of ceding the future. The revolutions may have been secular, but the character of new governments is still up for grabs.

Continue reading here

 

Islamists Dominate DOJ's List of Terror Prosecutions

 

More than 80 percent of all convictions tied to international terrorist groups and homegrown terrorism since 9/11 involve defendants driven by a radical Islamist agenda, a review of Department of Justice statistics shows.
Though Muslims represent about 1 percent of the American population, they constitute defendants in 186 of the 228 cases DOJ lists.
On Thursday, the House Homeland Security Committee holds its first hearing into radicalization among Muslim Americans. Critics have taken issue with the focus on one religious minority, but the DOJ list shows that radical Islamists are disproportionately involved in terror-related crimes.

More than 80 percent of all convictions tied to international terrorist groups and homegrown terrorism since 9/11 involve defendants driven by a radical Islamist agenda, a review of Department of Justice statistics shows.

Though Muslims represent about 1 percent of the American population, they constitute defendants in 186 of the 228 cases DOJ lists.

On Thursday, the House Homeland Security Committee holds its first hearing into radicalization among Muslim Americans. Critics have taken issue with the focus on one religious minority, but the DOJ list shows that radical Islamists are disproportionately involved in terror-related crimes.

Continue reading here

 

Turmoil in Mideast May Give Rise to Radicals

 

By Tawfik Hamid
February 24, 2011
The recent turmoil in the Middle East has resulted in a power shift from the hands of ruthless dictators to the hands of people. The result just may be a furthering of democracy. But there's  a risk, too, of increasing the power of radical Islamic movements that promote anti-Western sentiments. Such movements, ironically, were suppressed by the former dictators.
There are at least two possible trends that may emerge as a result of this turmoil in the Middle East. 
These societies marginalize radial Islamists when Islamic movements fail to remove these dictators with their violent attitudes and actions. This is in contrast to the success of the nationally driven peaceful movements that managed to remove these dictators via social media. 
Contributions of women and Christians to the success of these revolutions put radical Islamic movements in trouble as they can no longer claim that these two groups must be marginalized or treated as second class citizens. 
Radical Islam could take another hit when the hypocritical nature of Shariah-based regimens is exposed. Many in the Muslim world will start to question if Saudi Arabia, which one day justified beheading a Lebanese magician for the crime of “future telling” based on Islamic Shariah — is also ready to cut off the hand of the former president of Tunisia Bin Ali based on the same Shariah, if it is proved that he stole the money of his nation. 
The double standards in applying Shariah can contribute to more weakening of Islamism in the area. 
The beginning of weakening of Islamism has been exemplified in the recent decisions of leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to support a civilian (secular) rather than a theocratic country, and accept the former treaties of Egypt including the peace treaty with Israel. 
Also, they admit the importance of tourism industry to the country despite of the fact that a major part of this industry such as drinking alcohol and freedom of women to wear bikinis for swimming. 
However, it is still premature to judge if such changes in the Muslim Brotherhood that occurred after the revolution in Egypt are genuine ideological changes or just tactical means to help them reach power. 
It is vital that the U.S. try to build on this momentum. 
Radical Islam is by no means always tacking the soft tack: non-Muslim priests were brutally attacked and killed after the revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt. 
This trend could be aggravated by the expected sudden increase in poverty levels in the areas of turmoil as a result of collapse of tourism industry and fleeing of investments outside these countries for fear of instability. 
An immediate intervention by the West to bring the money that has been stolen by the dictators back to these countries can impede the growth of such radicals in the area.
Read more on Newsmax.com: Turmoil in Mideast May Give Rise to Radicals 
Important: Do You Support Pres. Obama's Re-Election? Vote Here Now!

By Tawfik Hamid
February 24, 2011

The recent turmoil in the Middle East has resulted in a power shift from the hands of ruthless dictators to the hands of people. The result just may be a furthering of democracy. But there's  a risk, too, of increasing the power of radical Islamic movements that promote anti-Western sentiments. Such movements, ironically, were suppressed by the former dictators.

There are at least two possible trends that may emerge as a result of this turmoil in the Middle East. 

These societies marginalize radial Islamists when Islamic movements fail to remove these dictators with their violent attitudes and actions. This is in contrast to the success of the nationally driven peaceful movements that managed to remove these dictators via social media. 

Contributions of women and Christians to the success of these revolutions put radical Islamic movements in trouble as they can no longer claim that these two groups must be marginalized or treated as second class citizens. 

Radical Islam could take another hit when the hypocritical nature of Shariah-based regimens is exposed. Many in the Muslim world will start to question if Saudi Arabia, which one day justified beheading a Lebanese magician for the crime of “future telling” based on Islamic Shariah — is also ready to cut off the hand of the former president of Tunisia Bin Ali based on the same Shariah, if it is proved that he stole the money of his nation. 

The double standards in applying Shariah can contribute to more weakening of Islamism in the area. 

The beginning of weakening of Islamism has been exemplified in the recent decisions of leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to support a civilian (secular) rather than a theocratic country, and accept the former treaties of Egypt including the peace treaty with Israel. 

Also, they admit the importance of tourism industry to the country despite of the fact that a major part of this industry such as drinking alcohol and freedom of women to wear bikinis for swimming. 

However, it is still premature to judge if such changes in the Muslim Brotherhood that occurred after the revolution in Egypt are genuine ideological changes or just tactical means to help them reach power. 

It is vital that the U.S. try to build on this momentum. 

Radical Islam is by no means always tacking the soft tack: non-Muslim priests were brutally attacked and killed after the revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt. 

This trend could be aggravated by the expected sudden increase in poverty levels in the areas of turmoil as a result of collapse of tourism industry and fleeing of investments outside these countries for fear of instability. 

An immediate intervention by the West to bring the money that has been stolen by the dictators back to these countries can impede the growth of such radicals in the area.

This article was originally published here

 

Pyramid Scheme

 

by Clifford May
Scripps Howard News Service
February 10, 2011
Amid a harmattan of news, analysis, and commentary blowing out of Egypt, one Twitter post stands out. An Israeli tweeted:
Dear Egyptian rioters,
Please don't damage the pyramids.
We will not rebuild.
Thank you.
A good joke always contains a nugget of truth. This one contains two. The more obvious is the reminder that Egyptians and Jews have an intertwined history, going back to antiquity "when Israel was in Egypt's land," as the spiritual made famous by Paul Robeson phrases it, the days when the ancestors of many of today's Israelis were slaves to pharaohs.
The less obvious implication is this: Israelis — and not just Israelis — are concerned that Egypt's revolution could be commandeered by radicals. Might such Islamists view the pyramids as the Taliban viewed the ancient stone Buddhas of Bamiyan — a shameful relic of the pagan past?
You can't rule it out. In 1999, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decree in favor of the preservation of the statues, noting that since there no longer were any Buddhists left in Afghanistan — we'll leave aside how that happened — there was no danger anyone would actually worship these graven images.
But many Afghan clerics disagreed, saying that the Buddhas — even if they were just photographed by foreign tourists — were nonetheless "against Islam." And so, in March 2001, the Taliban used anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and anti-tank mines to turn them into rubble. By then, Mullah Omar had changed his mind. "Muslims should be proud of smashing idols," he said. "It has given praise to God that we have destroyed them."
Six months later, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar's honored guest, would celebrate the worst terrorist attacks ever carried out on American soil. With him would be Ayman al-Zawahiri, then and now his top deputy, an Egyptian who had joined the Muslim Brotherhood at age 14. With bin Laden and al-Zawahiri in spirit would be Mohammad Atta, the 9/11 terrorist team leader and hijacker-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11 which he crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Also an Egyptian, Atta had joined a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organization in 1990.
Do the Egyptians demonstrating in Tahrir Square appreciate how threatening the Muslim Brotherhood is to the freedom they hope to win? Last week I was on Power and Politics, a serious Canadian television show, along with Dina Guirguis, a bright young Egyptian woman currently resident at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Understandably enthusiastic about Egypt's revolution, she also was dismissive of those who "hyperventilate" about the possibility that it could be appropriated by the Muslim Brotherhood and similar groups.
I really didn't want to rain on her parade. I make no brief for Mubarak, whose goal has been to create a pharaonic dynasty, not leave a democratic legacy. But I couldn't help but recall that exactly 32 years ago I was in Iran covering an upheaval very similar to the one now taking place in Egypt. And I knew young people very much like Dina — smart, educated in America and Europe, secular, liberal, and excited about the fall of the Shah and the prospect of a new, free, democratic, and prosperous Iran. They firmly believed that Ayatollah Khomeini not only tolerated them — he valued them. After all, the revolution succeeded because, for the first time, the radical clerics had been joined by students, merchants, socialists, communists, and other groups.
Before long, Khomeini and his followers had all the levers of power in their hands. My friends were sent to the gallows and the prisons or — if they were lucky — managed to flee into exile.
No, it doesn't have to be that way in Egypt. It helps that the Muslim Brotherhood apparently has no charismatic leader, no Egyptian Khomeini. But it's also true, as Omar Suleiman, now Egypt's vice president, told FBI Director Robert Mueller five years ago (according to WikiLeaks disclosures), that the Muslim Brotherhood has spawned "11 different Islamist extremist organizations, including Egyptian Islamic Jihad . . . " which today is a dominant faction of al-Qaeda.
So the question now is what can be done to help those who sincerely want a free, democratic, and prosperous Egypt, and what can be done to prevent anti-democratic forces from hijacking whatever democratic processes may be put in place — as the Khomeinists did in Iran in 1979, as Hamas did in Gaza in 2006, and as Hezbollah is doing in Lebanon right now with little resistance from the U.S., or Europe, or — needless to say — the U.N.
If the Muslim Brotherhood is made to compete in a war of ideas, there is a decent chance it will lose. It's one thing for the Brothers to proclaim: "Islam is the solution!" It's another for them to explain why it's okay if their policies scare off tourists and investors and lead to wars Egypt may not win, while deepening poverty and decreasing freedom for the vast majority of Egyptians.
Of course, Iran's rulers, Hezbollah, and Hamas do not rely on op-eds and television debates to advance their arguments. They murder those who disagree with them.
Stalin mused, "Death solves all problems — no man, no problem." The Muslim Brotherhood goes further. Just last year, its "Supreme Guide," Muhammad Badi, gave a sermon in which he said it was his hope and plan to raise "a jihadi generation that pursues death, just as the enemies pursue life." As a campaign slogan, that may not be as catchy as "Hope and Change." As a campaign strategy, it conveys distinct advantages.
And just this week, Kamal al-Halbavi, a senior member of the Brotherhood told the BBC that he hoped Egypt soon would have a government "like the Iranian government, and a good president like Mr. Ahmadinejad . . . "
Americans don't have enormous leverage to influence events on the ground in Egypt — but neither are Americans without leverage. Surely, we can and should identify those who are sincerely fighting for freedom and democracy and support them. This would begin to level the playing field. Apologists for the Muslim Brotherhood invariably talk about the organization's wonderful "social programs," its provision of food and medicine to the poor. Where do you think the money for all that comes from? Bake sales?
It is in Egypt's national interest — and America's, and, yes, Israel's — that Egyptians such as Dina Guirguis achieve their dream: opening a space for freedom and democracy in the heart of the Arab and Muslim Middle East. We do them no favor by not telling them this hard truth: Their most determined opponents are on the barricades with them.

By Clifford May

February 10, 2011

Amid a harmattan of news, analysis, and commentary blowing out of Egypt, one Twitter post stands out. An Israeli tweeted:

Dear Egyptian rioters,

Please don't damage the pyramids.

We will not rebuild.

Thank you.

A good joke always contains a nugget of truth. This one contains two. The more obvious is the reminder that Egyptians and Jews have an intertwined history, going back to antiquity "when Israel was in Egypt's land," as the spiritual made famous by Paul Robeson phrases it, the days when the ancestors of many of today's Israelis were slaves to pharaohs.

The less obvious implication is this: Israelis — and not just Israelis — are concerned that Egypt's revolution could be commandeered by radicals. Might such Islamists view the pyramids as the Taliban viewed the ancient stone Buddhas of Bamiyan — a shameful relic of the pagan past?

You can't rule it out. In 1999, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued a decree in favor of the preservation of the statues, noting that since there no longer were any Buddhists left in Afghanistan — we'll leave aside how that happened — there was no danger anyone would actually worship these graven images.

But many Afghan clerics disagreed, saying that the Buddhas — even if they were just photographed by foreign tourists — were nonetheless "against Islam." And so, in March 2001, the Taliban used anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and anti-tank mines to turn them into rubble. By then, Mullah Omar had changed his mind. "Muslims should be proud of smashing idols," he said. "It has given praise to God that we have destroyed them."

Six months later, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar's honored guest, would celebrate the worst terrorist attacks ever carried out on American soil. With him would be Ayman al-Zawahiri, then and now his top deputy, an Egyptian who had joined the Muslim Brotherhood at age 14. With bin Laden and al-Zawahiri in spirit would be Mohammad Atta, the 9/11 terrorist team leader and hijacker-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11 which he crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Also an Egyptian, Atta had joined a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organization in 1990.

Do the Egyptians demonstrating in Tahrir Square appreciate how threatening the Muslim Brotherhood is to the freedom they hope to win? Last week I was on Power and Politics, a serious Canadian television show, along with Dina Guirguis, a bright young Egyptian woman currently resident at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Understandably enthusiastic about Egypt's revolution, she also was dismissive of those who "hyperventilate" about the possibility that it could be appropriated by the Muslim Brotherhood and similar groups.

I really didn't want to rain on her parade. I make no brief for Mubarak, whose goal has been to create a pharaonic dynasty, not leave a democratic legacy. But I couldn't help but recall that exactly 32 years ago I was in Iran covering an upheaval very similar to the one now taking place in Egypt. And I knew young people very much like Dina — smart, educated in America and Europe, secular, liberal, and excited about the fall of the Shah and the prospect of a new, free, democratic, and prosperous Iran. They firmly believed that Ayatollah Khomeini not only tolerated them — he valued them. After all, the revolution succeeded because, for the first time, the radical clerics had been joined by students, merchants, socialists, communists, and other groups.

Before long, Khomeini and his followers had all the levers of power in their hands. My friends were sent to the gallows and the prisons or — if they were lucky — managed to flee into exile.

No, it doesn't have to be that way in Egypt. It helps that the Muslim Brotherhood apparently has no charismatic leader, no Egyptian Khomeini. But it's also true, as Omar Suleiman, now Egypt's vice president, told FBI Director Robert Mueller five years ago (according to WikiLeaks disclosures), that the Muslim Brotherhood has spawned "11 different Islamist extremist organizations, including Egyptian Islamic Jihad . . . " which today is a dominant faction of al-Qaeda.

So the question now is what can be done to help those who sincerely want a free, democratic, and prosperous Egypt, and what can be done to prevent anti-democratic forces from hijacking whatever democratic processes may be put in place — as the Khomeinists did in Iran in 1979, as Hamas did in Gaza in 2006, and as Hezbollah is doing in Lebanon right now with little resistance from the U.S., or Europe, or — needless to say — the U.N.

If the Muslim Brotherhood is made to compete in a war of ideas, there is a decent chance it will lose. It's one thing for the Brothers to proclaim: "Islam is the solution!" It's another for them to explain why it's okay if their policies scare off tourists and investors and lead to wars Egypt may not win, while deepening poverty and decreasing freedom for the vast majority of Egyptians.

Of course, Iran's rulers, Hezbollah, and Hamas do not rely on op-eds and television debates to advance their arguments. They murder those who disagree with them.

Stalin mused, "Death solves all problems — no man, no problem." The Muslim Brotherhood goes further. Just last year, its "Supreme Guide," Muhammad Badi, gave a sermon in which he said it was his hope and plan to raise "a jihadi generation that pursues death, just as the enemies pursue life." As a campaign slogan, that may not be as catchy as "Hope and Change." As a campaign strategy, it conveys distinct advantages.

And just this week, Kamal al-Halbavi, a senior member of the Brotherhood told the BBC that he hoped Egypt soon would have a government "like the Iranian government, and a good president like Mr. Ahmadinejad . . . "

Americans don't have enormous leverage to influence events on the ground in Egypt — but neither are Americans without leverage. Surely, we can and should identify those who are sincerely fighting for freedom and democracy and support them. This would begin to level the playing field. Apologists for the Muslim Brotherhood invariably talk about the organization's wonderful "social programs," its provision of food and medicine to the poor. Where do you think the money for all that comes from? Bake sales?

It is in Egypt's national interest — and America's, and, yes, Israel's — that Egyptians such as Dina Guirguis achieve their dream: opening a space for freedom and democracy in the heart of the Arab and Muslim Middle East. We do them no favor by not telling them this hard truth: Their most determined opponents are on the barricades with them.

 

Islam and the Intolerance Problem

 

January 23, 2011
By Cathy Young
RealClearPolitics
While the attempted murder of an American Congresswoman, Gabrielle Giffords, has prompted an outpouring of grief and soul-searching, the fatal shooting of a prominent elected official in another country around the same time has provoked a very different reaction. After Salman Taseer, governor of the Pakistani province of Punjab, was murdered by his own bodyguard, there was a wave of support for the murderer -- from religious figures and ordinary citizens, from several political parties, and even from a group of lawyers. The reason? Taseer had spoken out against Pakistan's blasphemy laws and in support of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman sentenced to death for allegedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad.
Such harrowing stories cannot be ignored in the discussion of Islam and religious tolerance. Last year, the controversy over Cordoba House, the planned Islamic cultural center and mosque near Ground Zero, turned into a debate about Islam and "Islamophobia." There is no question that some of the rhetoric in that debate crossed the line into anti-Muslim bigotry -- the portrayal of all or most Muslims as "the enemy" -- and that the self-proclaimed "anti-jihadists" who spearheaded anti-mosque campaign, such as bloggers Pamela Geller of Atlas Shrugs and Robert Spencer of JihadWatch, routinely traffic in gross caricatures of Islam as inherently and uniquely evil, oppressive, and violent. But all too many in the pro-mosque camp argued as if violent extremism in Islam today was as much of a fringe phenomenon as in Christianity or Judaism. This month's events in Pakistan remind us that is simply not the case.

January 23, 2011

By Cathy Young

RealClearPolitics

While the attempted murder of an American Congresswoman, Gabrielle Giffords, has prompted an outpouring of grief and soul-searching, the fatal shooting of a prominent elected official in another country around the same time has provoked a very different reaction. After Salman Taseer, governor of the Pakistani province of Punjab, was murdered by his own bodyguard, there was a wave of support for the murderer -- from religious figures and ordinary citizens, from several political parties, and even from a group of lawyers. The reason? Taseer had spoken out against Pakistan's blasphemy laws and in support of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman sentenced to death for allegedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad.

 

Such harrowing stories cannot be ignored in the discussion of Islam and religious tolerance. Last year, the controversy over Cordoba House, the planned Islamic cultural center and mosque near Ground Zero, turned into a debate about Islam and "Islamophobia." There is no question that some of the rhetoric in that debate crossed the line into anti-Muslim bigotry -- the portrayal of all or most Muslims as "the enemy" -- and that the self-proclaimed "anti-jihadists" who spearheaded anti-mosque campaign, such as bloggers Pamela Geller of Atlas Shrugs and Robert Spencer of JihadWatch, routinely traffic in gross caricatures of Islam as inherently and uniquely evil, oppressive, and violent. But all too many in the pro-mosque camp argued as if violent extremism in Islam today was as much of a fringe phenomenon as in Christianity or Judaism. This month's events in Pakistan remind us that is simply not the case.

Continue reading here
Cathy Young writes a weekly column for RealClearPolitics and is also a contributing editor at Reason magazine. She blogs at http://cathyyoung.wordpress.com/. She can be reached at cyoung@realclearpolitics.com

 

What Really Happened in the Middle East?

This presentation from the Terrorism Awareness Project brilliantly showcases the truth and lies behind the current battle for Israel. Click here to watch.

How you can make a difference

How you can make a difference

Watch this video to find how you can take an active role to become part of the solution.[Video]

The Third Jihad

The Third Jihad Trailer

The Third Jihad is a documentary that alerts Americans to the danger radical Islam poses to the United States and to Western civilization as a whole. The film spotlights radical Islam's war against liberal ideas, its violent, anti-democratic agenda as well as its human and civil rights abuses against women, blacks, homosexuals, Christians and moderate Muslims.[Video]